Sahel Dispatch - Jihadist Activity in Southwest Mali, June 2023

Welcome to Sahel Dispatch’s Southwest Mali Security Newsletter. This month we dig into the jihadist incidents in southwest Mali—Kayes, Koulikoro, and Sikasso regions—during June 2023. We focus on southwest Mali because it is home to rich mineral deposits and several industrial mines, which generate the bulk of Mali’s revenue. It also borders Senegal, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire, home to population centers and extensive commerce, business, and investment.

MINUSMA mandate ends

In a speech to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Malian Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop declared the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) a failure and demanded that it withdraw without delay. The UNSC terminated MINUSMA's mandate effective 30 June and stated its intent to withdraw all personnel by 31 December. This came less than one year after the withdrawal of French forces from Mali.

MINUSMA's withdrawal will create a security vacuum that the Malian military will struggle to fill. Expect northern armed groups and jihadist groups to contest for power in areas where MINUSMA once operated, further eroding the Malian state's control of its territory.

Jihadist activity increased in June  

In June, jihadist activity increased in Kayes, Koulikoro, Segou, and Sikasso regions. This includes during the period leading up to Mali's 18 June constitutional referendum, when the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) coalition sought to disrupt voting by targeting and damaging polling booths, kidnapping electoral officials, and intimidating citizens.  

Kayes Region  

There were 37 security incidents in Kayes region in June, six more than in May. These included jihadist and non-jihadist incidents such as attacks, arrests, murders, robberies, and theft. Most notably, Katiba Macina, part of JNIM, carried out seven attacks, three more than in May. The attacks demonstrated that Katiba Macina can conduct lethal operations in southwest Mali—signifying an increased threat to Senegal and Mauritania. Security and defense forces conducted at least one operation against jihadists, resulting in at least one arrest.

Koulikoro Region 

There were 51 security incidents in Koulikoro region in June, 30 more than in May. These included jihadist and non-jihadist incidents such as intimidation, arrests, kidnappings, improvised explosive device (IED) detonations, and robberies. Jihadist and FAMa activity has remained consistent over the past year, even during the rainy season. Security and defense forces conducted at least two operations against jihadists, resulting in at least nine arrests.

Segou Region  

There were 34 security incidents in Segou region in June, 11 more than in May. These included jihadist and non-jihadist incidents such as attacks, IEDs, murders, and kidnappings. Looking forward, we can expect a decrease in activity in northern Segou during the July to November rainy season. Flooding from the Niger River will likely limit the jihadists' and FAMa's ability to operate on the ground. As a result, FAMa—with its Russian partners—was likely to rely on aerial operations during that period. Security and defense forces conducted at least four operations against jihadists, resulting in at least 40 arrests.

Russian military contractors 

Despite the mid-June fall-out between the Wagner Group and the Russian government over the war in Ukraine, joint FAMa/Wagner operations continued in Mali in late June. Furthermore, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Russian contractors would remain in Mali. FAMa and Wagner conducted joint operations in central Mopti, central Segou, and northern Koulikoro in June. Joint FAMa/Wagner operations have degraded jihadist operations in central Mali and caused jihadists to move south.

The bottom line

JNIM's activities in Kayes place Mauritania and Senegal at greater risk. The incidents also demonstrate the Malian state's inability to conduct effective security operations throughout its territory. 

The end of MINUSMA will almost certainly lead to further degradation of the security situation in northern Mali, specifically Gao and Menaka regions. It will also increase the probability of confrontation between the Malian state and northern armed groups. Such a confrontation would weaken Mali's ability to provide security nearly everywhere else and probably benefit JNIM. JNIM, in fact, might end up striking up an alliance with the northern armed groups. This, too, would strengthen JNIM's hand in central and southern Mali, including Kayes region. 

Additionally, MINUSMA's withdrawal will likely accelerate the movement of jihadists from JNIM into southwestern Mali. 

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