Sahel Dispatch - Littoral West Africa Security Incidents, June 2023
Welcome to the Littoral West Africa Security Report for July 2023. This monthly report tracks the spread of jihadism from the Sahel to the northern areas of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin—also known as Littoral West Africa. As the situation deteriorates in Mali and Burkina Faso, we're seeing more jihadist incidents in the Littorals. By tracking them with our on-the-ground network, traditional and social media, and publicly available conflict data, we aim to deliver insights that stakeholders—including governments, militaries, businesses, and NGOs—can use to create the conditions for peace and prosperity in the region.
On 19 July, jihadists disguised as herdsmen attacked villagers in the hamlet of Bouliérou in Daloga village, near Benin's border with Burkina Faso. The jihadists killed two civilians and injured two others. Beninese defense and security forces deployed to the area.
The Beninese Armed Forces purchased three armed Puma helicopters from France, which the Beninese Army plans to use to transport troops.
There were no reported jihadist incidents in Côte d'Ivoire in July—the same as in May and June.
There were several incidents in Ghana in July, slightly more than in June. On 18 July near Bawku, Upper East Region, jihadists burned a truck and killed its driver. On 21 July, an armed group attacked civilians on a Kumasi-Bawku bus on the outskirts of Walewale, in the North East region, killing one civilian and injuring several others.
In mid-July, the Ghanaian Army repatriated Burkinabè refugees from the five Ghanaian regions bordering Burkina Faso. On 12 July, Ghanaian Deputy Minister of Defense Kofi Amankwa-Manu confirmed the operation and claimed that the Army had repatriated over 20,000, mainly ethnic Fulani.
In response, the local branch of al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) responded to the repatriation operation by issuing an unofficial and unauthenticated audio recording calling on sympathizers to launch jihad in Ghana if abuse against Fulanis continued.
In late July, Ghana and Italy agreed to deepen cooperation. During President Nana Akufo-Addo's official visit to Italy, Italian President Sergio Mattarella pledged support for the Accra Initiative and claimed that the stability of the Sahel region was important. Mattarella also pledged support to counter piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Togo saw multiple incidents during July. Jihadists ambushed a Togolese security and defense forces mission killing at least twelve soldiers and damaging equipment.
In July, jihadists ambushed a Togolese security and defense forces mission in Kpendjal, Savanes Region, Togo, killing at least twelve soldiers and damaging equipment.
On 14 July, the Togolese Army launched Operation Koundjoare to prevent jihadist attacks in Tampialim, Savanes region. The Army killed two hundred oxen, burned down huts and motorbikes, and arrested around fifteen young pastoralists. On 15 July, Togolese security and defense forces conducted aerial strikes against jihadists in Sankortchagou, near Kpendjal. Political activist Egountchi Behanzin claimed Togolese security and defense forces received counter-drone training in northern Togo.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announced it would provide a US$ 3 million humanitarian aid package to support refugees in northern Togo. USAID intended to work with the World Food Programme (WFP), Catholic Relief Services, and local authorities in Savanes region to provide food aid. Families would also receive training in income-generating activities.
Takeaways
Recent events show a mixed picture of the political stability of the Littoral region. On the one hand, jihadism has established itself as a threat, at least in Benin, Ghana, and Togo, with Burkina Faso serving as a safe haven for jihadist groups. We think the threat will continue as long as the crisis in Burkina Faso continues. On the other hand, the threat remains small in scale, and the Littoral states continue to demonstrate that they can act effectively through their various security measures. They are not doomed to share Burkina Faso's fate.
JNIM's threat against Ghana for allegedly targeting Fulani refugees must be watched. While we cannot ascertain the extent to which Ghana might be targeting Fulanis, the perception is in and of itself dangerous—both in terms of the potential for radicalizing Fulanis and the ability of JNIM to exploit the perception. JNIM has also proven astute in instrumentalizing ethnic conflict for its own recruitment and propaganda aims; it has made significant inroads in the Fulani communities of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. JNIM already operates in northern Ghana, and any threat against the country should be taken seriously.
It is too early to tell how the late July coup that toppled former Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum will affect the Littoral states. If the security situation in Niger worsens due to the new transitional government's counterterrorism policies, we could see jihadism from Niger spread to Benin, given the two countries shared border. A decline of security in Niger would also worsen the situation in Burkina Faso, which could then affect the Littoral states, Benin included.
Additionally, the coup will complicate coordination and cooperation between the Littorals and Niger. This could negatively affect counterterrorism and border security. For example, this same scenario has affected cooperation between the Littorals and Mali.
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