Sahel Dispatch - Southwestern Mali Security

August 2023

Dear Readers,

Welcome to Sahel Dispatch's southwestern Mali Security Newsletter. This month, we dig into the jihadist incidents in southwestern Mali—Kayes, Koulikoro, Segou, and Sikasso region—during August 2023. We focus on southwest Mali because it's home to rich mineral deposits and several industrial mines, which generate the bulk of Mali's revenue. It also borders Senegal, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire, which have population centers and extensive commerce, business, and investment

Jihadist activity decreased in August 2023 in Kayes, Koulikoro, Segou, and Taoudenni/Timbuktu regions but increased in Sikasso region. The continuing rainy season in Mali contributed to the overall decrease. We expect a similar level of jihadist activity in September.

MINUSMA began its withdrawal this month, handing over bases in Ber (50 kilometers east of Timbuktu), Goundam (90 kilometers southwest of Timbuktu), and Ogossagou (Mopti region). There'll be more base turnovers in the months leading to MINUSMA's complete withdrawal, slated for the end of 2023. This will leave a governance and security vacuum in Gao and Menaka regions and damage the local economy.

The Malian Armed Forces started moving into abandoned MINUSMA positions, which has set it up for a conflict with the so-called "signatory" groups—Arab and Tuareg groups that signed the 2015 Algiers Accord. In mid-August, Malian Armed Forces and Wagner Group occupied the former MINUSMA camp in Ber.

There have already been clashes between the two sides and a significant risk of open warfare. This will push many of the signatory groups closer to the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) jihadist coalition. In fact, JNIM started a blockade of Timbuktu following clashes with the Malians.

The coup d'état in Niger on 26 July may spell the end of Western involvement in the battle against jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel. The clear beneficiaries of this are the jihadist insurgents that operate on Nigerien soil: Islamic State Sahel Province and JNIM in the west, and Boko Haram and Islamic State West African Province in the east. The new junta in Niamey has already asked the French to leave, although thus far, Paris refuses to comply.

Whatever happens, the coup will further degrade the security situation in Niger and, ultimately, in Burkina Faso and Mali. This will strengthen the hand of JNIM and the Islamic State, which will affect Mali.

So far, the death of Wagner mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin has not affected Russian operations in Mali, given that the operations serve Russian interests. Expect Moscow will not terminate the operations but will continue them under new management.

The biggest takeaway for August is that the conflict between Bamako and the CMA will strengthen both JNIM and the Islamic State, increasing insecurity throughout the country, including in Kayes and Sikasso regions, home to commercial mining. The threat to Mali's neighbors will increase—including Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal.

- 14 North

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